

Some Developments in the Strategic and Operational Planning of a Second World War  
American Reporters

The hitherto general opinion about a possible military conflict between West and East has been, that the USA would make war in Europe, first of all, by means of their airforce. For this purpose only the British Isles, the Iberian Peninsula, Southern Italy, Greece, Turkey and the Middle East had to be held as air bases. The rest of Europe would be left at first to the Soviets, until this area could be delivered from the Eastern Highways by an efficient air offensive, carried out with the most modern battalions equipped with the right aircraft by command of the Army around Berlin. In this way a basis would be created for striking out the final decision in Russia and Asia.

There is no doubt, this strategical conception contains a few fatal mistakes. The invasion in 1941 was carried out against an adversary, very well prepared by Hitler, and whose tanks are hardly equalled anywhere in mobility, strength and speed. Very strong forces have been bound by the Russian and German front. This wouldn't be so in the first phase of a war against the Soviets, even if large-scale amphibious landing maneuvers of the Northern Allies should be made in the Pacific Ocean.

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in their country, thus enabling millions of Russians to be  
serviles at the front.

The coming war will certainly be determined, in a further de-  
gree than the last one, by groups of partisans and members of  
resistance organizations. As anybody knows, resistance movements  
can't be set into operation from one day to the other, not at  
all under Soviet occupation rule, which would suggest in the very  
beginning any such attempt. (This doesn't mean however, that one  
couldn't build up underground organizations also under American  
rule) An evacuation of central Western Europe by the American and  
British troops without any serious resistance, would soon at next  
in the public opinion. The thesis of invasion invincibility  
is a matter of fact. The propagandistic effect upon the whole world  
would be immense. The bulk of the European population would at  
first keep quiet; a not pre-considerable number of persons in every  
occupied country would collaborate with the Russians, and the  
presumable activists would have been put aside by the Soviets,  
as pointed out above.

The Anglo-American retreat would be considered like leaving  
Europe in the lurch, and the psychological effect produced by  
this fact shouldn't be neglected. Moreover, air-raids against the  
Red Army, particularly when they are started during an invasion,  
would hit first the population of the occupied countries.

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of those conditions, so obviously came to the Western powers.

It must not be left to the American Army push forward in all cases so far as the Atlantic coast, and meet no decisive resistance.

be offered before the Pyrenees. The best section to stop the American attack would probably be the Rhine. Considering the heavy superiority of the Western Allies' ground forces, the Americans and French troops in Western Germany and Austria will not be able to offer any lasting resistance (apart from delaying fighting on the Weser, the upper course of the Danube, the Inn, the Salzach, or in the Black Forest) before the Rhine line.

There may be objected to the conception that "the Rhine forms a natural existing line," that crossings of such a stream can be made at every time; then they are carefully prepared. The crossing of the Rhine by the Germans in 1940, and by the Western Allies in 1945 may be quoted here, but this objection is but partially founded.

In both these crossings have been carried out under essentially different circumstances. In both cases the defender could make efficient use of his Air Force, but this probably would not be bearing, as the fact that the crossings have been carried out with a defencelss Southern flank (Switzerland having been neutral at this time), the strategical issues would be completely different and incomparably better for the Western Allies. When these circumstances should alter, that is, when the Helvetic Confederation could be included in a system of Western Allies. There is no doubt that Switzerland could be induced to give up her armistice neutrality as the military and political leaders can hardly overlook the fact that Stalingrad's Armies will not stop at the Rhine. Apart from all strategical considerations, the highly developed special abilities and all other resources are available to large in incident to the Soviets.

Highly favourable situation is, on the one hand, a consecutive link between the Central Alpine and Highland, sloping to the lower plain lowlands and the Lombard-Venetian plain; on the other hand her eastern frontier forms a bulwark, bulging out approximately 120 km of the Alpine front West - East I, flanking this front as well as the Western part of the Alpine of the Alps, thus the strategical importance of Salzburg is allied with the Western Alps. It is lined out. In case of emergency, Switzerland for herself can not retreat, as provided by the General Staff, into the so-called Reduit, in the Alps, gathered in front. This would naturally endanger the whole line of defense running along the Salzach-Salz, the Rhine to Basel. Should it however be possible to build up a large Alpine Fortress, consisting of Switzerland and the high mountain region of Western Austria and South Tyrol with American and British aircraft of which an offensive could be started in the first instance, thus probably preventing the Russians crossing the Alpine, and so to the before-mentioned pushing forward to the South. Any possible offensive operations would be threatened from the Alpine, the possible steps,

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not necessary, and it is not always necessary. It would be very dangerous to imagine that in any given case of a request, the requestor is entitled to have his request honored.

For example, the right of appeal, for instance, is not available later. The right of appeal, however, does not give the right to withdraw the original application or evidence, which is illegal. Requests may be denied. For instance, when in 1969, the

...initiative, abandoned by the anti-viborged by the anti-Nationalists  
and now dominated by General Lefebvre, dictated the (for  
that time) highly developed French Army and its cause for a longer  
period a perceptible disturbance to Napoleonic authoritarian policy.

The psychological scaling of the Frenchman's defeat on the  
Mars Hill (a hill near Ansdorf) was immense. It has exposed  
their misuse of invincibility, and has become a point of Napoleonic  
moral deliberation against Napoleon. During world war II, the  
Allied Front delayed for a long time the break down of the  
"Wittelsbachite", though their deficiency of men and material had  
been simply ridiculous. It does not seem it was not von who decided  
addition operations, but the failure utilization of the conditions  
natural difficulties. owing to this factor various leaders of Nazi  
Germany viewed the possibility to prevent a total break down by  
establishing an Alpine Fortress. The Frenchman, these plans  
~~had~~ been carried out was, but it was too late when the idea had  
been proposed to Hitler, whom I believe already reflect on this  
time. (Before the fall of France each an hour would have been  
checked of no more difficult in Hitler's eyes. This was apparently  
the reason, why Mr. Norman kept the very reasonable plan of the  
Alpine Fortress, projected by Generalleiter Heiter, for several  
months, before he handed them to the Hitler.) Notwithstanding, a  
great part of these plans could have been prepared in the last  
half year before the German attack started. They were projected in various  
instances. At any rate the internal situation opposition again to the  
continuation of the war under such circumstances had been considerable  
and the endeavour to prevent it, had been very strong. In the end  
Hitler death and the Dimitroff's intervention tripped all those  
plans. It was one of history's grotesques that the Western Allies  
(especially the Americans, before all others) has elected a neutral  
and provided for the least opportunity of the Alpine Fortress,  
while Hitler didn't make use of this big chance.

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The Stettinius region, has been prepared in view of the next war. A coming war could start under essentially the same condition, when it should be possible to build up an impregnable fortress, comprising a large area, and with the Silesian hubut as a center, which would serve as head of a bridge, to prevent a Russian drive towards Western Europe. The possibilities for such a project are absolutely existing.

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While Switzerland would be the center-piece of the Alpine Process, the Swiss Army had to be the basis of military resistance. The excellently organized and disciplined Swiss Army will be contributing to this objective, as it is equipped with the most modern weapons and needs to be considered the best army of Western Europe. Strong voluntary forces from the surrounding areas would be available, no doubt. The Austrian, and especially the South German mountain troops would have the advantage of being familiar within the country, as well as with the mountain fighting methods. While the British General Staff has apparently not provided an all-for-degree force, case of emergency, such preparations had to be begun from the start, in the Belgian and North Italian areas. This will not be an easy task, considering prevailing political conditions in these two countries.

On the other hand, it must be kept in mind that certain allied authorities are preparing a so called "Roll-over-network", for the case of a Russian occupation of these countries. So, preparations of such an objective might be started as well today.

The first step in this direction would be the creation of a central commanding staff for the respective countries' planned working formations. This commanding staff might be kept small at first and could deal with the most urgent cases and collaboration with a corresponding American, and eventually other Western European authorities. A collaboration with the British General Staff would be productive as it is experiencing in the matter. In case of necessity, Switzerland might principally be relying on itself. For all preparatory work, on various of course, e.g., the principle objectives of this commanding staff would be the following: First, a recognition of the Alpine Forces' basic requirements, detailed planning of the blocking up of roads, roads and bridges, necessary to set them in a state of defense; recommendations about cover and the possibility to prepare cover for the selection, starting places, railroads, supplies and food supplies; (i.e. the Austrian High Alpine Areas); a long range cover, offered, a safe shelter approach, etc.; secondly, and supply distribution; organization of a rail connection, and finally, points of departure for carrying out, plans for invading areas.

(offensive weapons) will have to be prepared to prevent the drop. In  
an emergency situation, the dropping of cover and bombing of  
troops might be an early objective therefore started at once. However,  
no action ought to be made by the colonizing staff.

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The second stage had to precede on certain systems of radio operation in the areas that cover probably will be occupied by the enemy, enabling the R.C. to get recognition from behind the enemy's back. A system of agents for reconnaissance and intelligence work would be established in the Alpine Fortress area. Transmissions on the Alpine Alpine signal system, the eventually would penetrate it in France from the interior, the first permanent functionaries of the German Party, agents of the R.C. would then be able to help themselves very to spread their message with our radio stations of the Alpine. The first of these stations, very early, will be established, and will be made available to all of the closest cooperation with the R.C. of Alpine movements of the various occupied countries. The R.C. will be responsible for the radio distribution of Alpine in the creation of radio stations to the European resistance movement in Alpine, both requiring a long time for organization and planning.

In the second phase, "Day" came when the general political situation would enter at higher level, the "Day" anti-fascist movement must be strengthened and given more bridges basis; in spite of the risk of becoming liable, however, and at the same, however, perhaps, dangerous points must be established in all Alpine centers of resistance, in uniform, anti-fascist, solid and so on. The anti-fascist, should try to form fighting groups capable of uniting in general the military struggle.

The third phase would mean the illegal recruiting of volunteers, the centralized preparation of armaments and so forth. In this moment, the propaganda must be starting, pointing out the objectives of the native resistance; radio transmitters must be installed, illegal pamphlets and posters must be distributed.

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It would be very difficult to recruit volunteers at this moment, but it would be an easy thing to call the volunteers in no time, to obtain the information and to change the necessary plotting up to point. Then the resistance will be made known in the public for the first time and the organization will act in officially.

It is very difficult to give any figures about the probable strength of available volunteers at the present moment. It will be recommended to form small fighting groups, counting not over 3,000 men. 20 of these voluntary fighting groups should certainly be organized in Austria at the beginning. A multiple of this could be counted with, when recruiting should be extended also to German territory. Special care must be applied to the North Styria

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Territory and experience during world war II have shown, that the Alpine soldiers must be relied upon very much, though the North Italian mountaineers are not quite so bad. The planned voluntary formations would be only the standing units of a regular national army, in case of emergency, or just the mountaineers are very able soldiers, fit for the service up to their old age. The famous "Tyrolian standartillers" (Schneschützen) may be quoted as an example. This defensive fight could have quite a particular basis, compared with other areas, as every man would fight for his wife, children and relatives, his housemates, in short, for all he likes. The thought of a victory, even if small, will strengthen the fighting morale. The main advantage of such a national warfare is, that the whole civilian population can be used, but that would be balanced by the above mentioned circumstances. A large scale provisioning and highest insufficiency of supplies (vegetable protein, being very much neglected in Austria) would solve these problems.

The present and future of world war III may be made available, though many of these common regulations couldn't be applied to this kind of war. Specialists in partisan warfare in the Balkans must be consulted from the beginning, to avoid all mistakes. Motor cars, except, tractors, will be rather useless, but mules and mountain ponies will be needed. The groups must carry larger caliber guns, heavy mortars, light anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank guns and mountain howitzers. The fire power of the combat unit, which is to be equipped with modern pistols and machine guns, must be extremely high. Mortars might be well used in the mountains. Groups must be very carefully outfitted, especially with irregular and good fighting men. Particles must be prepared in a large scale, marching in ranks, a verme, or these probably won't be organized even with such sharp weapons.

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fortifications, to prevent the Germans crossing the Rhine, ... 10. not be dealt with in its place. By means of the excellent British armful available, motorized forces could be thrown far this purpose in the neutral fields with necessary speed. The highest aim, the Belgian and Dutch frontier fortifications must be restored in time, to look out all eventualities. A counter-move from Holland against the German north flank could be an efficient completion to the offensive from the Alpine fortress. By this, a big anti-war guarantee and promising encircling of German forces could be prepared. That is little

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shall be said here about the Western Allies' other objectives, military objectives, or offensive operations in the Mediterranean, particularly in the Balkans, with stone bombs or poison gas bombs. There is a better survey of those matters in the concerned General Staff. The question of a partnership with the Western Allies in the defense of the Alpine fortresses, for how much, in spite of difficulties, however, can be counted with the national volunteer corps, is not a matter of this stage. Only thoughts about the opportunity of an Alpine foothold ~~had been~~ pointed out here. It ~~had been~~ stated however, that the Alpine stage, offering of capable men could be started at once, a competent, reliable, reliable in every way, and able to match any task set at disposition.

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